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The rule of res judicata is said not to have been definitely
formulated until 1776,1 but, in essence, it is of much earlier
origin and application. Primarily, the rule is one of public
policy, and, secondarily, of private benefit to individual litigants.
The primary principle early found expression in the maxim,
"Interest reipublicae ut sit finis litimh," and the secondary or
subordinate one in the form "Nemo debet bis vcxeii pro unct
et eadem cause." The whole doctrine bears a close resemblance
to the exceptio rei jiudieatae of the Roman law.2
Although the doctrine of res judicata is frequently invoked,
yet difficulties continue to be encountered in its application, par-
ticularly where either court or counsel fails to realize that, of
the two principles which it comprehends, the protection from
the annoyance of repeated litigation, which the individual suitor
is afforded, is, after all, only an incident of the first principle,
that the best interests of society demand that litigation be con-
cluded. The inclusive idea is set forth in an early Pennsylvania
case thus: 3
"The maxim, ?zemo debet bis vexari, si eonstcW euriac qztod sit
pro nw,i et eadem causa, being... established for the protection
and benefit of the party,... he may... waive it, and unques-
tionably, so far as he is individually concerned, there can be
no rational objection to his doing so. But then it [must] be
recollected, that the community has also an equal interest and
concern in the matter, on account of its peace and quiet, which
ought not to be disturbed at the will and pleasure of every in-
dividual, in order to gratify vindictive and litigious feelings.
Hence, it would seem to follow that wherever, on the trial of
a cause, from the state of the pleadings in it, the record of a
judgment rendered by a competent tribunal upon the merits
in a former action for the same cause, between the same parties
or those claiming under them, is properly given in evidence
to the jury, it ought to be considered conclusively binding on
both court and jury, and to preclude all further inquiry in the
cause; otherwise the rule or maxim, expedit rcipub!icac ut Sit
finis litium, which is as old as the law itself, and a part of it,
will be exploded and entirely disregarded."
I Duchess of Kingston's Case, 3 SInrH, LaDInZG CASEs (9th ed. 1776)
1998.
2BRoom, LEGAL MAxIMS,* 327 et scq.
' Marsh v. Pier, 4 Rawle 273, 288 (Pa. 1833). For modern exprc2cions
of the same principles see State Hospital v. Consolidated Water Co., 2G7
Pa. 29, 37, 110 At. 281, 283 (1920); Commonwealth v. Kelly, 2S7 Pa. 19,
144, 134 Atl. 514, 516 (1926).
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Economy of the time of the courts is one of the obviously
beneficial results of the doctrine, and this feature becomes in-
creasingly important as work crowds more and more on our
overburdened tribunals; but the broader and even more im-
portant aspect of the public policy of res judicata is its promo-
tion of peace and quiet in the community through the creation
of certainty in the relations of men.
There is a certain resemblance between the doctrines of res
judicata and stare decisis; I both are rules of public policy in-
tended to maintain stability in human relations by giving repose
to litigation, and both operate to prevent the constant recon-
sideration of settled questions, but they operate in somewhat
different fields and with different degrees of authority., Stare
decisis deals exclusively with matters of law and principle, and
may be applied to such matters only when the proved facts
of a pending case coincide with, or approximate, those of a prior
one; whereas res judicata, though fixing the law of the actual
controversy, has to do particularly with the protection from
attack of judicially established facts. Also, stare decisis, while
of high authority, is not absolutely binding in subsequent cases,
that is to say, the court may reconsider the question previously
passed upon and modify or reverse its former pronouncements
of law; but res judicata is not so yielding-it binds alike both
courts and litigants.0 As a plea, a former adjudication is a
bar to subsequent suits for the same cause; as evidence, it is
conclusive of the facts therein established.7
Speaking broadly, the rule of res judicata means that when
a court of competent jurisdiction has determined, on its merits,
a litigated cause, the judgment entered, until reversed, is, for-
ever and under all circumstances, final and conclusive as between
the parties to the suit and their privies,8 in respect to every
fact which might properly be considered in reaching a judicial
determination of the controversy, and in respect to all points of
law there adjudged, as those points relate directly to the cause
of action in litigation and affect the fund or other subject-matter
then before the court. And under some circumstances, a judg-
4 See Moschzisker, Stare Decisis in Courts of Last Resort (1924)
37 HARv. L. RE V. 409.
S State Hospital v. Consolidated Water Co., supra note 3, at 39, 110 At].
at 284.
6 Marsh v. Pier, supra note 3.
7 34 C. J. 743.
8A comment on Tasin v. Bastress, 284 Pa. 47, 130 Atl. 417 (1925), in
(1926) 35 YALE L. J. 607, 608, states: "A privy within this rule must be
one who claims an interest in the subject-matter affected by the judgment
through or under one of the parties, i.e., either by inheritance, succession
or purchase; and this interest must have been acquired after the rendition
of the judgment." See authorities there cited.
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ment will, in certain respects, so establish the legal status of
an object or person directly involved in a suit as to bind all
parties who may subsequently deal with it or him, even though
those thus dealing may have had no connection with the litiga-
tion in which the judgment was entered. Issues of fact actually
determined in a prior suit, and also those which were relevant
subjects for determination therein, cannot be re-examined in a
subsequent legal proceeding, between the same parties or their
privies, involving the identical cause of action formerly tried.
Even where the cause of action in a pending suit is not
identical with that previously litigated between the parties, all
relevant issues of fact that were actually raised in the prior
litigation are res judicata between the parties and their privies,
-though, under such circumstances (that is, where the second
suit turns on a different cause of action) issues which might
have been, but were not, raised and determined in the prior suit,
are not accounted in law as res judicata. Finally, the rule of
res judicata holds good not only in the court which rendered
the judgment in question, but in other tribunals where the same
facts or points of law may later be directly at issue.
Certain Pennsylvania decisions well illustrate the effect of res
judicata in the field of law, as distinguished from that of fact,
its binding force so far as concerns the law governing a par-
ticular cause of action or object of judicial consideration, and
its lack of applicability to the law in subsequent suits on other
causes of action or relating to other objects of judicial considera-
tion, even when such later cases are between the same parties
as those who figured in the suit or proceeding which gave rise
to the original judgment or decree.
To instance one illustrative decision on the operation of res
judicata in the field of law: in 1372, the Pennsylvania legisla-
ture passed an act which, among other things, reduced the
amount of tax previously imposed by the charter of the Ridge
Avenue Railway Company of Philadelphia. An adjudication of
the corporation's liability was made under this act, and taxes
were paid accordingly during a considerable period. Subse-
quently, in an independent suit, the supreme court of the state
held the act unconstitutional. The City of Philadelphia im-
mediately commenced action against the company to recover the
difference between the reduced taxes paid under this invalid
statute, and the amount that would have been due according
to the original charter, for the period from 1880 to 1883 in-
clusive, and was allowed to recover. On appeal, it was held that
the prior litigation determining the taxes for the years in ques-
tion, though brought under the unconstitutional Act of 1872, was
conclusive of the cause of action there involved, that the judg-
ment rendered in that suit was res judicata, and the subsequent
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decision holding the act unconstitutional could not alter the ef-
fect of such prior judgment; in short, the first suit had deter-
mined the whole liability as to the taxes which were then
claimed,-the law and facts in regard to that subject-matter had
been settled once and for all, however erroneous the view taken
of the law might have been. This case well shows the binding
force in the field of law of the doctrine under discussion when
a particular cause of action, already reduced to judgment, again
comes before the courts in another suit between the same parties.
In litigation between the same parties, but involving causes
of action, or objects of judicial consideration different from those
previously reduced to judgment, the doctrine of res judicata
is not applied to questions of law. This is made plain by many
Pennsylvania decisions concerning successive distributions of
different funds in the same estate, which hold that where issues
of fact in regard to the persons entitled are raised and deter-
mined on the first distribution, those facts are binding in any
subsequent distribution,o but that at a later distribution, there
is no obligation on the court to follow the law as determined
in the former proceeding, if it was erroneous.11 Thus, on a
partial distribution of an estate, the fund was awarded to cer-
tain individuals under an application of the rule in Shelley's
Case; no exceptions were taken to this award. Later, additional
assets of the same estate were to be distributed; the auditing
judge then held that the rule in Shelley's Case was not applicable
and awarded the fund to others than those who had been favored
by the first award. Though it was objected that the former
adjudication was conclusive, the distribution last made was sus-
tained on appeal, the supreme court saying: 12
"The law applied in the first distribution, if inapplicable, is
not the law of the case; the duty of the auditing judge in dis-
tributing a second [fund] is to distribute according to law
... ; and in discharging this duty he must be free to disregard
a decision of his own, or that of another, upon the same bench,
which as he is better informed he would reject."
Identity of parties is one of the classic requisites to the opera-
tion of a judgment as res judicata. The effect of the authori-
ties is that, as a general rule, res judicata can be invoked only
where the subsequent litigation is between the parties to the
9 Philadelphia v. Ridge Ave. Ry., 142 Pa. 484, 21 At]. 982 (1891) ; In ro
Pulaski Ave., 220 Pa. 276, 69 Atl. 749 (1908).
10 Bowers' Estate, 240 Pa. 388, 87 At]. 711 (1913); Kellerman's Estate,
242 Pa. 3, 88 Atl. 865 (1913); Havir's Estate, 283 Pa. 292, 129 Atl. 101
(1925).
"'Kellerman's Estate, Havir's Estate, both supra note 10; Guenther's
Appeal, 4 Wkly. Notes Cas. 41 (Pa. 1877).
12Stewart J., in Kellerman's Estate, supra note 10 at 12, 88 Atl. at 869.
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former judgment or their privies, and that others can neither
take advantage of nor be bound by the result of the first action. 2
That, under ordinary circumstances, a former judgment should
not be conclusive of any matter against one who had no part
in the proceedings which led to it, excepting, of course, those
in privity - to the litigants, is an obviously just and proper
rule; but the result of strict adherence to the requirement of
identity of parties on both sides is to permit, in some instances,
repeated litigation of adjudged points. Thus, spealdng gener-
ally, a litigant, having lost a battle on questions of fact, is per-
mitted to reopen all the old issues in a second action, provided
he has a new adversary not in a position to set up the former
judgment as determining those matters. It may be argued that
better administration of law would result if the rule simply
demanded that the one agaiist whom a forer ju'gmclit is used
shall have been a party to that judgment, or shall have been
in privity with one who was a party, without demanding that
the one seeldng to use the judgment shall likewise be so situated.
Such a rule, however, would always require a litigant to estab-
lish or defend his position to the utmost; whereas the law takes
cognizance of the frailties of human nature and realizes that,
even in litigation, one, because of consideration for his opponent
or for other reasons personal to himself, may not desire either
to establish or defend his position to the utmost, and that, for
purposes of the particular case, he may admit facts or fail to
meet evidence, which he would combat as against another op-
ponent. This, rather than the desire to maintain the mutuality
so often required in equity, is probably the reason why res
judicata has been held to apply only as between parties to the
original suit, or their privies, with certain exceptions relating
to personal status, and also to some actions in rem where the
legal position of the res is established as against, or in favor
of, all persons thereafter dealing with it.2 Examples of these
's Commonwealth v. Quaker City Cab Co., 286 Pa. 224, 133 Ati. 223
(1926); Bigelow v. Old Dom. Copper Co., 225 U. S. 111, 02 Sup. Ct. 641
(1912); Keokuk & W. R. R. v. Missouri, 152 U. S. 301, 14 Sup. Ct. 592
(1894); Tasin v. Bastress, supra note 8; 1 GrNLAF, EvMENCE (16th ed.
1899) § 524. It is also necessary that the parties shall have been adverze
in the prior proceeding; this, however, does not mean that they must have
been plaintiff and defendant respectively; it is sufficient if they Vere awzert-
ing adverse interests even though they were both denominated defendants or
plaintiffs. Pittsburgh & L. E. R. R. v. McKees Rocks, 287 Pa. 311. 115
Atl. 227 (1926); Hertzel v. Weber, 283 Fed. 921 (C. C. A. 8th, 1922);
Renfro v. Hanon, 297 Ill. 353, 130 N. E. 7410 (1921); 34 C. J. § 1.478.
2 See Comment (1926) 35 YALr L. J. C07.
15 "An apparent exception to this rule, a? to the identity of the parties,
is allowed in . . . proceedings in r, ,,, which include not only judgmnts
of condemnation of property, as forfriterl or as prize, . . . but alzo the
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exceptions may be found in decrees or judgments as to marriage,
divorce, legitimacy, feme sole traders, bankruptcy, condemned
property, the probate and validity of wills, and in cases which
involve title to property where all parties in interest are brought
on the record. Such judgments and decrees, when entered on
the merits, are binding on all persons subsequently litigating
as to the status or thing involved in the original suit, whether
or not the persons in question were parties to that proceeding.
Other exceptions to the requirement of identity of parties
are sometimes made in favor of persons who sustain a relation-
ship of secondary or derivative liability to a defendant,-such
as principal and agent in tort cases, and indemnitor and in-
demnitee,6 who have long been accorded the benefits of the
principles of res judicata in respect to judgments for one or the
other; though in many situations a judgment against one of such
parties is held not conclusive upon the other. Thus, in a suit
based on the negligence of one's servant, a judgment in favor
of defendant concludes the plaintiff on the issue of the servant's
alleged negligence, in a subsequent action brought by such plain-
tiff against the servant himself; 17 but a judgment for plaintiff
in the first case would not be conclusive in the subsequent action
against the servant.1 8
decisio'ns, . . . directly upon the personal status or relations of the party,
such as marriage, divorce, bastardy, settlement, and the like. These de-
cisions are binding and conclusive, not only upon the parties actually
litigating in the cause, but upon all others." 1 GREENLUAF, op. cit. SUpma
note 13, § 525. Examples of the effect of such judgments may be seen
in Hood v. Hood, 110 Mass. 463 (1872) (divorce); Gelston v. Hoyt, 3
Wheat. 246 (U. S. 1818) (forfeiture; good discussion by Story, J.); Ennis
v. Smith, 14 How. 400 (U. S. 1852) (pedigree); New Lamp Chimney Co.
v. Ansonia Brass & Copper Co., 91 U. S. 656 (1875) (status of bank-
ruptcy). Matters of probate, judgments as to validity of wills, settlement
of accounts of executors, and discharge of bankrupts are other types of
judgments in rem, effective against the world. See 1 HERMAN, ESTOITrEL
AND RES JUDICATA (1886) § 290 et seq.; Burlen v. Shannon, 3 Gray 387
(Mass. 1855); Huntsville v. Goodenrath, 13 Ala. App. 679, 68 So. 676
(1915); 34 C. J. § 1483.
16Bigelow v. Old Dom. Copper Co., gupra note 13; Hayes v. Chicago
Tel. Co., 218 Ill. 414, 75 N. E. 1003 (1905); Cressler v. Brown, 79 011ka.
170, 192 Pac. 417 (1920) (containing a particularly full discussion and
citation of authorities); Hill v. Bain, 15 R. I. 75, 23 Atl. 44 (1885).
1 Lasher v. McAdam, 125 Misc. 685, 211 N. Y. Supp. 395 (Sup. Ct.
1925).
18 Rookard v. Atlanta, & C. Ry., 84 S. C. 190, 65 S. E. 1047 (1909);
34 C. J. 976. An excellent example of a common-sense, liberal attitude
toward the problem of identity of parties is seen in Commonwealth v.
Kelly, supra note 3, where in a contest between two factions of a volun-
tary association as to the right to hold office, a former case, decided in
Maryland, was held to make the matter res judicata, although the Mary-
land case was in equity in the names of the national and state lodges
of the association, and the Pennsylvania proceeding was on quo warranto
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Negligence cases for defective streets and sidewalks also show
allowable exceptions to the requirement of identity of parties.
In these cases a municipality, having paid a judgment against
it for injuries sustained by reason of a defective street or side-
walk, seeks reimbursement from the abutting property owner or
from a public service company fixed with a duty to maintain
the way in safe condition. Although the defendant in this
second suit may not be in privity with either party to the former
suit, it is apparently well settled that, if he had notice of the
action against the municipality and an opportunity to intervene
and defend, he is concluded by the judgment there entered so
far as it determined the existence of the defect in the street or
sidewalk, the cause of the injury, the amount of damage sus,
tained and the liability of the former defendant; "I but that
judgment would not affect or conclude the question of the second
defendant's own negligence,-°" if that point was not at issue in
the first case. If the defendant in the second suit did not have
sufficient notice and opportunity to defend the first suit,21 no
force of res judicata is given to the judgment there entered.22
Where a suit is instituted by an injured plaintiff against one
of several parties who might be held responsible for defects in
a street, either against a municipality, a traction company (oc-
cupying the roadway), or an abutting owner, and the action
results in a judgment on the merits for defendant, there seems
at the relation of certain individuals, against other individuals. The
court, differentiating the case from those in which title to tangible prop-
erty is in dispute, looked behind the mere form and refuscd to d(ny the
application of res judicata for lack of identity of parties, saying that in
both cases the same interests were representcd, and the same qucstions
and subject matter were involved, and that it is just such repeated liti-
gation that the doctrine of res judicata is designed to prevent.
19 Brookville v. Arthurs, 130 Pa. .01, 1 Atl. 1076 (1890); Reading v.
Reiner, 167 Pa. 41, 31 Atl. 357 (1895); Philadelphia v. Bergdoll, 252 Pa.
545, 97 At. 736 (1916); Bradford v. Barry, 254 Pa. 303, 98 At. 975
(1916) ; Richmond v. Sitterding, 101 Va. 354, 43 S. E. 562 (1903) ; Grand
Forks v. Paulsness, 19 N. D. 293, 123 N. W. S7S (1909); Note (1912)
40 L. R. A. (w. s.) 1172.
2O See cases s.pra note 19.
21 The rule in the federal courts is that any knowledge of the pendency
of the action against the municipality is sufficient notice. Robbins v.
Chicago, 4 Wall. 657 (U. S. 1866); Wolfe v. Barataria Land Co., 255
Fed. 503 (C. C. A. 8th, 1919); Caldwell v. Blodgett, 256 Fed. 744 (C. C. A.
8th, 1919). Other courts, however, require that there shall have been
formal notice and a request tG intervene given by the municipality, in
order to conclude the owner on any point. Seattle v. Northcrn Pac. Ry.,
47 Wash. 552, 92 Pac. 411 (1907); Lebanon v. MIead, 64 N. H. 8, 4 Atl.
392 (1885).
22r Oth v. Consumers Gas Co., 280 Pa. 118, 124 Atl. 296 (1924); Chcter
v. Schaffer, 24 Pa. Super. 162 (1904); Baltimore & 0. R. R. v. Howard
County Comm'rs, 111 Md. 176, 73 Atl. 656 (1909).
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to be less agreement as to the force of such a judgment in a
subsequent suit by the same plaintiff against one of the other
palties charged with the duty of keeping the roadway or side-
walk in repair. In dealing with these cases, much depends
upon the theory of liability of the respective defendants enter-
tained by the particular jurisdiction. For example, in Pennsyl-
vania an abutting owner is regarded as having the primary
obligation to maintain the sidewalk in front of his property;
and although the municipality may be sued directly by one who
is injured because of a defect in that part of the street, yet
its liability is regarded as secondary, not a responsibility for
failing to repair, but only for omitting to make the abutting
owner do so.z Under this view, if, in a first suit against the
abutting owner, it were adjudged that he was not at fault, the
judgment in favor of the abutting owner would be a bar to
a subsequent action against the municipality. The theory of
primary and secondary obligations does not prevail in all juris-
dictions, however, and it is not the rule even in Pennsylvania
as to defects in the highway which a street railway or other
public service company is bound to maintain.24 In this latter
class of cases, the municipality is regarded as having a primary
and independent liability, not simply a derivative one, and, so
far as res judicata is concerned, difficulties appear, the ques-
tion arising, what is the effect upon the independent liability
of the municipality of a prior judgment in favor of the street
railway company?
In an Oklahoma case, 25 the city and the street railway com-
pany were regarded as joint tortfeasors, a view rejected, how-
ever, by a number of jurisdictions, 2 and the court refused to
allow the force of res judicata to a prior judgment for one of
these parties, on the ground that a finding in favor of one joint
tortfeasor cannot be set up as a defense by the other. This result
naturally follows from holding the parties joint tortfeasors, for
the respective defendants would not be in privity,27 and it would
be unnecessary to view the cause of action as the same, since
each suit would be based upon the acts, or failure to act, of
the particular defendant involved. It is commonly said that
23 Dutton v. Lansdowne Borough, 198 Pa. 563, 48 Atl. 494 (1901).
24 Lawrence v. Scranton, 284 Pa. 215, 130 Atl. 428 (1925); Aiken v.
Philadelphia, 9 Pa. Super. 502 (1899).
25 City of Tulsa v. Wells, 79 Okla. 39, 191 Pac. 186 (1920).
26 Dutton v. Lansdowne Borough, supra note 23; Goodman v. Coal Town-
ship, 206 Pa. 621, 56 Atl. 65 (1903); Brobston v. Darby Borough, 290
Pa. 331, 138 Atl. 849 (1927); Mooney v. Edison Elec. Co., 185 Mass.
547, 70 N. E. 933 (1904). Heils v. Cincinnati Traction Co., 33 Ohio C.
C. 122 (1911).
27 Bigelow v. Old Dominion Copper Co., supra note 13.
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the liability of joint wrongdoers is joint and several; to speak
more accurately, it is joint or several, since the injured plain-
tiff must elect between a joint action against all or separate
suits against one or more of the tortfeasors.3 If he elects to
sue separately, and recovers a judgment against one of the joint
tortfeasors, the almost universal rule is that such a judgment,
so long as it remains unsatisfied, does not bar an action against
another of them for the same tort; 20 and Freeman, in his work
on Judgments,-° after stating this rule says, "Neither is a judg-
ment in favor of one joint tortfeasor evidence in favor of or
a bar to an action against another,3 except where the liability
of the latter is purely derivative, or he is entitled to indemnity
from the other." 32 At other places in his work, Freeman
says,3 ' of the above exceptions, that they are not really excep-
tions, but are determined by other principles, such as the doc-
trine of election, etc. Moreover, even in such cases, the first
judgment is no bar when it is based on grounds not applicable
2 8 Sessions v. Johnson, 95 U. S. 347 (1877); Cameron v. Kanrich, 201
Mass. 451, 87 N. E. 605 (1909); Moore v. Chattanooga Elec. Ry., 119
Tenn. 710, 109 S. W. 497 (1907). In some jurisdictions, however, no
such election is required, and plaintiff may institute both joint and
several actions. Gilbreath v. Jones, 66 Ala. 129 (1880); Davis v. Cas-
well, 50 Me. 294 (1862).
293Betcher v. McChesney, 255 Pa. 394, 100 Atl. 124 (1917); Johnson
Co. v. Philadelphia, 236 Pa. 510, 84 Atl. 1014 (1912); Fox v. Northern
Liberties, 3 W. & S. 103 (Pa. 1841); Cole v. Roebling Const. Co., 15G
Cal. 443, 105 Pac. 255 (1909); Tandrup v. Sampsell, 234 InI. 526, 85 N.
E. 331 (1908); Nugent v. Boston Cons. Gas Co., 238 Mass. 221, 130 N. E.
483 (1921); Old Dominion Copper Min. Co. v. Bigelow, 203 Mass. 159,
89 N. E. 193 (1909), affd, 225 U. S. 111, 32 Sup. Ct. 641 (1912); Squire
v. Ordemann, 194 N. Y. 394, 87 N. E. 435 (1909). A contrary rule prevails
in England and Canada. Brown v. Wootten, Cro. Jac. 73 (100); Brins-
mead v. Harrison, L. R. 7 C. P. 547 (1872); Longmore v. McArthur,
19 Mlan. 641 (1910). It has also been followed in Rhode Island. Roberts
v. Rhode Island Co., 41 R. I. 235, 103 Atl. 714 (1918); Hunt v. Bates,
7 R. I. 217 (1862). Virginia at one time followed the English rule. Staun-
ton Mut. Tel. Co. v. Buchanan, 108 Va. 810, 62 S. E. 923 (1908). But
this rule has been changed by VA. CODE (1919) § 62G4. Fitzgerald v.
Campbell, 131 Va. 486, 109 S. E. 308 (1921). Of course, where the prior
judgment has been satisfied, the second action cannot be maintained.
z02 FREEnAN, JUDGMENTS (5th ed. 1925) § 573.
31 Old Dominion Copper Co. v. Bigelow, smpra note 29; Nelson v. Illinois
Cent. R. R., 98 Miss. 295, 53 So. 619 (1910); Three States Lumber Co.
v. Blanks, 118 Tenn. 627, 102 S. W. 79 (1907).
32 See Bigelow v. Old Dominion Copper Co., supra note 13, and Portland
Gold Mining Co. v. Stratton's Independence, Ltd., 15S Fed. 03 (C. C. A.
8th, 1907), where these exceptions are discussed, and the cases are col-
lected.
3 1 FnEnnAN, op. cit. supra note 30, §§ 451, 470; 2 ibid. § 573.
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to both defendants, 34 or where the facts determining liability
are not the same.
3 5
In a Missouri case, 36 the court likewise refused to allow the
force of res judicata to a prior finding for one of two defendants
in a case such as we are now considering. It so ruled, how-
ever, not on the ground that they were joint tortfeasors, but
on the ground that defendants thus situated had, as toward the
public, separate and independent duties to maintain the street,
and the fact that one of them had been acquitted of a violation
of its duty in that regard did not determine the charge against
the other. Either of these theories may well lead to complica-
tions, and defeat the public policy represented in the doctrine
of res juaccata. For example, suppose a suit, by one injured
because of the defective condition of the roadway, is first brought
against a traction company, bound to maintain the portion of
the street in which the defect existed and a judgment is entered
in favor of the company. The plaintiff in this prior suit later
recovers a judgment against the municipality, and it, in turn,
seeks by another suit to recoup itself from the street railway
company. On the theory .of independent liabilities, the last-
mentioned suit would, of course, not be for the same cause of
action as that first instituted against the company, and on that
ground the judgment in such prior case would not be a bar.
The result is that the company, having once successfully de-
fended itself against a claim arising from a particular alleged
defect in the street, would be forced to defend itself again, this
time against the municipality's claim; both suits involving the
same state of facts, so far as the existence of the defect and
the resulting injuries are concerned. Thus the public policy
of res judicata would be defeated. Realizing the situation, a
number of jurisdictions have held that the first judgment, in
favor of the railway company, barred the municipality's subse-
quent action against that defendant. While reaching this de-
cision, the courts have labored somewhat in seeking established
principles upon which to rest their position. They have used
grounds of subrogation, of principal and agent, of principal and
surety, of primary and secondary obligations; but none of them
with entire satisfaction." As said in a Rhode Island case,09
34 Hearn v. Boston & M. R. R., 67 N. H. 320, 29 Atl. 970 (1892).
85 Emma Silver Min. Co., Ltd. v. Emma Silver Min. Co., 7 Fed. 401
(C. C. S. D. N. Y. 1880).
36 Sutter v. Kansas City, 138 Mo. App. 105, 119 S. W. 1084 (1909).
37The following are examples: Sawyer v. Norfolk, 136 Va. 60, 116
S. E. 245 (1923); Featherson v. Newburgh & C. Turnpike Co., 71 Hun
109, 24 N. Y. Supp. 603 (2d Dep't 1893); City of Anderson v. Fleming,
160 Ind. 597, 67 N. E. 443 (1903); Brobston v. Darby Borough, spira
note 26.
38 See Hill v. Bain, 15 R. 1. 75, 76, 23 AtI. 44 (1885).
RES JUDICATA
"The courts [when dealing with the class of controversies
which we are now considering] allow themselves a good deal of
latitude in applying the rule [so far as identity of parties is
concerned], observing the spirit ... rather than the letter [of
the rule]."
In a recent Pennsylvania case, where an injured person
brought suit against a trolley company, whose tracks were laid
on the highway under an obligation assumed by the company
to maintain the road in good repair, it was found that the cor-
poration had not failed in that regard, and judgment was en-
tered on a verdict for defendant. Later the same plaintiff in-
stituted suit in another court, on the same state of facts, against
the municipality; it was held that, nowithstanding a difference
in parties, res judicata applied, and judgment was entered ac-
cordingly. On appeal, in affirming the court below, the supreme
court of the state said:
"If a recovery were now had, then the borough defendant
could compel, by suit, the street railway to pay for the injury,
where in a regular judicial proceeding it has been declared not
to be responsible. The plaintiff elected to sue the one ultimately
liable, and failed to recover, and he cannot now be permitted
to secure judgment against the borough for this identical negli-
gence. If so, then the latter can seek a recovery from the former,
though its non-liability has been adjudicated, and compel it to
defend a proceeding based on a cause of action previously deter-
mined in its favor. . . . Ordinarily, an estoppel by judgment
is only applied where parties are the same, or in privity; ... but
an apparent exception to the rule of mutuality has been held
to exist where the liability of defendant is altogether dependent
upon the culpability of one exonerated in a prior suit upon the
same facts, when sued by the same plaintiff; in such cases the
unilateral character of the estoppel is justified by the injustice
which would result in allowing a recovery against a defendant
for conduct of another, when that other has been exonerated in
a direct action. 34 C. J. 988. If the liability rests on the proof
of wrongdoing by one, and the necessary facts to establish it
have been found adversely in a prior proceeding, a suit against
another, based on the same cause of action, cannot be main-
tained."
A rule often repeated in elaboration of the requirement of
identity of parties, states that one is not bound by a judgment
entered in a case where he sued or defended in his individual
capacity, when such judgment is pleaded as res judicata in a
subsequent suit where he appears only in a representative char-
acter; 4o and the doctrine as thus stated may be accepted as
39 Brobston v. Darby Borough, supa note 26.
4 0 Noyes v. Noyes, 233 Mass. 55, 123 N. E. 395 (1919); Collins v. Hy-
dorn, 135 N. Y. 320, 32 N. E. 69 (1S92); Baker v. Small, 17 Pa. Super'.
423 (1901); 34 C. J. 997.
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satisfactorily expressing the law applicable to a vast number
of situations where the change of capacity represents an actual
change in the real parties in interest. Thereby rights of bene-
ficiaries, such as legatees, devisees, minors and others, are pro-
tected from being concluded by former judgments to which the
fiduciary representing them in a subsequent action was a party
in an individual capacity.4' Not infrequently, however, the
change of capacity is but formal, the record parties and those
really in interest, being in fact the same although named dif-
ferently. It is essential, therefore, in examining the question
of identity of parties in any particular situation, that the court
look beneath the surface and ascertain what are the interests
actually represented; since, if this is not done, a mere change
in designation of parties on the record may bring about the
very evils against which the doctrine of res judicata is intended
to protect. For example, an administrator who is sole heir
should not be permitted, by styling himself administrator in
one proceeding and heir in another, to litigate the same ques-
tion twice. In a case recently before the United States Supreme
Court,4 claims for compensation for a single injury had been
made in two separate proceedings, one under a state compensa-
tion act, and the other under the federal statute. The plaintiff,
though the same party in each case, sued individually in one,
and in a representative capacity in the other. The fact that
the accident happened in intra-state commerce was determined
in the first proceeding, and it was held that this fact was res
judicata in the second. Certain earlier cases in the federal
courts had decided that, under such circumstances, an adjudica-
tion in one of the two proceedings could not be res judicata in
the other.4 3 The later decision,4 mentioned above, apparently
overrules these earlier cases, and, at least in the federal courts,
settles the law to this effect: that, when the parties and interests
represented, though named differently, are in fact the same, res
judicata applies.
4' Collins v. Hydorn, supra note 40; First Nat. Bank v. Shuler, 153 N.
Y. 163, 47 N. E. 262 (1897); Baker v. Small, supra note 40.
42 Chicago, R. I. & Pac. Ry. v. Schendel, 270 U. S. 611, 46 Sup. Ct. 420
(1926). For examples of other cases in which the court looked to the real
interest involved in passing on questions of identity of parties, see Stewart
v. Montgomery, 23 Pa. 410 (1854); Commonwealth v. Cochran, 146 Pa.
223, 23 Atl. 203 (1892); Hochman v. Mortgage Finance Corp., 289 Pa.
260, 137 At]. 252 (1927); Corcoran v. Chesapeake & 0. Canal Co., 94 7.
S. 741 (1876); In re Estate of Parks, 166 Iowa 403, 147 N. W. 850
(1914); Lake v. Weaver, 80 N. J. Eq. 395, 86 Atl. 817 (1912).
V Troxell v. Delaware L. & W. R. R., 227 U. S, 434, 33 Sup. Ct. 274
(1912); Dennison v. Payne, 293 Fed. 333 (C. C. A. 2d, 1923). A similarly
mistaken view seems to have been taken in Noyes v. Noyes, tsupra note 40.
" Chicago, R. I. & Pac. Ry. v. Schendel, supra note 42.
310
RES JUDICATA
As indicated earlier in this article, there is a difference, so
far as the doctrine of res judicata is concerned, between (1)
a suit employed to re-litigate a cause of action previously tried,
and (2) one which, though presenting a cause of action not
previously before the courts, yet involves those who were parties
to prior litigation which to some extent comprehended issues
of fact again sought to be raised. In the first instance, since
the doctrine operates to bar entirely the reopening between the
same parties of a cause of action once terminated, it prevents
later judicial consideration not only of the questions of fact
which were actually raised in the former suit, but also of every
relevant issue which might properly have been raised there to
sustain or defeat the claim in controversy.4 1 In the second in-
stance, where the subsequent or pending suit is upon a different
claim, or cause of action, though between the same parties and
involving some of the same issues of fact, res judicata is ap-
plicable only to such issues as were actually raised and deter-
mined in the former suit.G
To illustrate the governing principle, wherethe causes of action
in the original and pending proceedings differ: in a suit to collect
coupons of certain corporate bonds, the plaintiff was not allowed
to prove he was a holder in due course, because, in a former suit
by him on other coupons attached to the same bonds, recovery had
been denied on the ground that he had not shown he occupied
that position. The Supreme Court of the United States reversed
the judgment, deciding that the causes of action were different,
and failure of the plaintiff to show that he was a holder in
45 United States v. California & 0. Land Co., 192 U. S. 255, 24 Sup.
Ct. 266 (1904); Northern Pac. Ry. v. Slaght,, 205 U. S. 122, 27 Sup. Ct.
442 (1907); Bowman Co. v. Hern, 239 Mass. 200, 131 N. E. ,034 (1921);
Barber Paving Co. v. Field, 132 Mo. App. 628, 97 S. W. 179 (1900); Mc-
Gunnegle v. Pittsburgh & L. E. R. R., 269 Pa. 404, 112 Atl. 553 (1921);
Cressler v. Brown, supra note 16; 34 C. J. 818.
-0 Reich v. Cochran, 151 N. Y. 122, 45 N. E. ,367 (1896); Fayerweather
v. Ritch, 195 U. S. 276, 25 Sup. Ct. 5S (1904); Wright v. Griffey, 147 Ill.
496, 35 N. E. 732 (1893); McChristal v. Clisbee, 190 Mass. 120, 76 N.
E. 511 (1906); Funk v. Young, 254 Pa. 548, 99 At. 76 (1916); Jachzon
v. Thomson, 215 Pa. 209, 64 AtI. 421 (1906); Bowers' Estate, cupr- note
10; Kellerman's Estate, supra note 10; State Hospital v. Consolidated
Water Co., supra note 3; Lowry v. Atlantic Coal Co., 272 Pa. 19, 115
Atl. 847 (1922); Mloorhouse v. Boorhouse, 6 Pa. Dist. 495, aff'd, 7 Pa.
Super. 287 (1898).
An example of how these two situations are confused and essential
limitations omitted in the language of the case, is seen in the following
passage from Stokes v. Foote, 172 N. Y. 327, 344, 05 N. E. 176, 182
(1902): "There is no doubt as to the general rule that a judgment of
a court of competent jurisdiction is final and conclusive upon the partiez,
not only as to the issues actually determined, but as to every other ques-
tion which the parties might or ought to have litigated. In other words,
all the issues that were necessarily involved."
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due course on the trial of the first case did not preclude such
proof in the second. Justice Field, who wrote the opinion,
dwelt at length upon the distinctions to be recognized, summar-
izing as follows: 47
"In considering the operation of this judgment, it should be
borne in mind ... that there is a difference between the effect
of a judgment as a bar or estoppel against the prosecution of
a second action upon the same claim or demand, and its effect
as an estoppel in another action between the same parties upon
a different claim or cause of action. In the former case, the
judgment, if rendered upon the merits, constitutes an absolute
bar to a subsequent action; it is a finality to the claim or de-
mand in controversy, concluding parties and those in privity
with them, not only as to every matter which was offered and
received to sustain or. defeat the claim or demand, but as to
any other admissible matter which might have been offered for
that purpose. . . . If such defenses were not presented in
[a prior] action, and established by competent evidence, the
subsequent allegation of their existence is of no legal conse-
quence. The judgment is as conclusive, so far as future pro-
ceedings at law are concerned, as though the defenses never
existed. The language, therefore, which is so often used, that
a judgment estops not only as to every ground of recovery or
defense actually presented in the action, but also as to every
ground which might have been presented, is strictly accurate,
when applied to the [particular] demand or claim in contro-
versy.... But where the second action between the same parties
is upon a different claim or demand, the judgment in the prior
action operates as an estoppel only as to those matters in issue
or points controverted, upon the determination of which the
finding or verdict was rendered. In all cases, therefore, where
it is sought to apply the estoppel of a judgment rendered upon
one cause of action to matters arising in a suit upon a dif-
ferent cause of action, the inquiry must always be as to the
point or question actually litigated and determined in the
original action, not what might have been thus litigated and
determined."
The rule under consideration, as such, is simple enough; the
difficulties come in its application, chiefly in determining whether
the second proceeding is upon the same claim or cause of action
as the former one. Where, in the second suit, the parties bear
the same relation to each other as they did in the first, and the
claim is stated in the same terms, even though the forms of
action may differ, the rule is not hard to apply; the identity
of the causes is obvious and the former judgment may be in-
voked as a bar to the whole proceeding without serious difficulty.
The term "same cause of action" cannot, however, be confined
to such situations. For instance, in a case before the Missouri
Court of Appeals there had been a former proceeding in equity
47 See Cromwell v. County of Sac, 94 U. S. 351, 352-353 (1876).
RES JUDICATA
between the same parties, to enjoin the enforcement against
plaintiff's land of tax liens which he claimed were invalid, where-
in the validity of the liens was upheld. The second proceeding
was at law, by the former defendants against the former plain-
tiff, to enforce the same liens. The court held that the cause
of action was the same, and refused to allow defendant to attack
the validity of the liens on grounds which he could have raised
in the former equity suit but did not, saying: 4 3
"In the determination of the question of whether in a given
case the two actions involve the same claim or demand... the
test questions to be answered are these: Will both actions em-
brace the same issue, require the same evidence, and, though
different in form, call for substantially the same result? If
these questions may be answered in the affimative, the claims
are the same, though one action may be in equity and the other
at law, and the plaintiff in one may be the defendant in the
other."
It is impossible to lay down an all-inclusive and satisfying
formula to determine whether or not causes of action are
identical. Facts and issues of infinite variety are brought into
litigation in numberless ways; these the courts seek to decide,
and, by passing judgment on them, to relegate to oblivion, but
shortly another crop of litigation springs up, with facts and
issues bearing marked resemblance to those recently put to
rest. When this occurs, it must be determined whether these
facts and issues present only the old questions, endowed by the
ingenuity of counsel with a semblance of life, or are, in truth,
new issues, and therefore legitimate work for the courts. The
cases do perhaps warrant a definition to this extent: for purposes
of res judicata, there is identity of causes of action when in
both the old and new proceedings the subject-matter ' and the
1-3 Barber Paving Co. v. Field, supra note 45, at 639, 97 S. W. at 181.
49 The statement is occasionally made, in cases concerning title to prop-
erty, that it is not essential that the same subject matter be involved
to make two causes of action the same, but that it is suflcient if they
involve the same title. This is the view tahen by Justice Clifford in
Aurora City v. West, 7 Wall. 82 (U. S. 1868), and again in his disZenting
opinion in Cromwell v. County of Sac, svpra note 47, citing in both cases
Outram v. Alorewood, 3 East 346 (1803). But how can it be said that a
claim for property not claimed before is the same cause of action as a
former one? Necessarily, if in the prior action there was litigation and
adjudication of a title upon which a party must rely in the sub2cquent
action, that issue is res judicata, and in all probability it will control
the result of the second action; but this is not because the claims are the
same, but because an issue essential to the case has actually been adjudi-
cated. This was exactly the situation in Outram v. Morewood. An inter-
esting split of authority on a point of this kind is found in regard to the
question whether a judgment concerning liability to a certain tax in one
year is res judicata in efforts to collect the same tax for a subsequent
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ultimate issues are the same; but, beyond this, determination
of the question must rest in the sound discretion of the courts
as applied to the circumstances of each case, having proper re-
gard both to the public policy of res judicata and to the rights
of the parties to have every bona fide issue passed upon.
Illustrations of suits not to be classed as new litigation, since
in essence they are no more than attempts to retry previously
determined causes, on grounds that might have been presented
in former proceedings, may be found in instances where defeated
parties seek to recover damages from former opponents, alleging'
the latter procured judgment in their favor by illegitimate
means °0 It has been generally held that cases of this character
are not maintainable, for the very gist of the new action is
an allegation that the former judgment was improper. To per-
mit such a case to be proceeded with would be in effect to re-
open the judgment entered in the prior suit and retry the
merits in a collateral proceeding. Despite first appearances to
the contrary, the causes of action are the same, in the sense
that the facts alleged are such as could have been litigated in
the first suit. But there are many other instances where the
identity of causes of action is not so easy of solution.
The decision as to identity of causes of action occasionally
depends on rules of substantive law in the particular jurisdic-
tion. This occurs, for example, in regard to the question as to
whether an injured plaintiff may institute more than one action
against a particular defendant to recover damages arising out
of the same tortious act; that is, whether there can be separate
suits for injury to the person and injury to property, occasioned
by the same tort. In dealing with this problem, the great ma-
jority of courts, regarding the wrongful act as the basis of the
cause of action, hold that all damages which are to be obtained
must be recovered in a single suit,r' and when that is determined
the cause of action is res judicata. But a few decisions treat
year. The federal courts regard such an adjudication as res judicata, but
a number of state courts take the view that no determination concerning
liability in one year can control a claim for taxes in another year. The
cases on each side of the question are collected in the opinion of Chief
Justice Taft in United States v. Stone & Downer Co., 274 U. S. 225, 47
Sup. Ct. 616 (1927).
50 McMichael v. Horay, 90 N. J. L. 142, 100 Atl. 205 (1916); Dunlap
v. Glidden, 31 Me. 435 (1850); White v. Merritt, 7 N. Y. 352 (1852);
Smith v. Lewis, 3 Johns. 157 (N. Y. 1808); Cunningham v. Brown, 18
Vt. 123 (1896).
51 Seger v. Town of Barkhamsted, 22 Conn. 289 (1853); Braithwaite v.
Hall, 168 Mass. 38, 46 N. E. 398 (1897); Chicago W. D. Ry. v. Ingraham,
131 Ill. 659, 23 N. E. 350 (1890) ; Hazard Powder Co. v. Volger, 3 Wyo. 189,
18 Pac. 636 (1888); Poling v. Washington Loan Co., 289 Fed. 610 (App.
D. C. 1923); cf. also Baltimore Steamship Co. v. Phillips, 274 U. S. 316,
47 Sup. Ct. 600 (1927).
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the injury as the basis of the cause of action, and accordingly
permit separate suits for each injury, though it does not appear,
from the reports of these cases,- 2 whether or not they embody
any exception to the general doctrine of res judicata as applied
to distinct causes of action. If the courts, in the class of cases
under consideration, follow the usual principles of res judicata,
then, on the trial in the second suit, practically all questions ex-
cept those relating to the damages sustained would be excluded
as previously determined; 53 but if they throw open the whole
case, including the issues of negligence and contributory negli-
gence, they certainly violate cardinal principles of res judicata.
The terms res judicata and estoppel are so closely linked in
legal parlance that at times the two seem to be used almost inter-
changeably; yet it is essential to keep in mind the difference be-
tween the estoppel elements of res judicata and estoppel in pais.
This distinction was noted in an early Pennsylvania case thus: 51
"The effect of a judgment, of a court having jurisdiction over
the subject-matter of controversy between the parties, even as
an estoppel, is very different from an estoppel arising from the
act of a party himself, . .hich [latter estoppell may or may
not be enforced at the election of the other party, because what-
ever the parties have done by compact they may undo by the
same means. But a judgment of a proper court, being the
sentence or conclusion of the law, upon the facts contained
within the record, puts an end to all further litigation on ac-
count of the same matter,... even by the consent of the parties,
and is not only binding upon them, but upon the courts and
juries ever afterwards, as long as it shall remain in force and
unreversed."
Both forms of estoppel operate to deprive one of the right
to assert a legal claim or defense which otherwise would be
available to him, but they are different in principle and origin.
Res judicata is a rule of public policy -s laid upon suitors to
52 Brunsden v. Humphrey, 14 Q. B. Div. 141 (1884); Reilly v. Sicilian
Paving Co., 170 N. Y. 40, 62 N. E. 772 (1902); Watson v. Texas & Pac.
Ry., 8 Tex. Civ. App. 144, 27 S. W. 924 (1894); see also (1904) 59 CUNT.
L. J. 244.
5 As in defective sidewalk cases cited supra note 18.
54 Marsh v. Pier, supra note 3, at 289; see also Raisig v. Graf, 17 Pa.
Super. 509, 512 (1901).
55 See Kilheffer v. Herr, 17 S. & R. 319 (Pa. 1828). The facts of res
judicata must be on the record in some form to warrant their consideration
by an appellate court; they must have been introduced in evidence or
presented in some other judicial manner. Pasquinelli v. Southern Mac-
aroni_-Mfg. Co., 272 Pa. 468, 116 AtI. 372 (1922); John Deere Plow Co.
v. Hershey, 287 Pa. 92, 134 Atl. 490 (1926). The absence of these facts
from the record ex-plains many of the cases which refuse to consider rea
judicata on the appeal. There are, however, other cases which reject
consideration of the question if it was not made an issue below, regardlezs
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maintain general peace, promote certainty, and conserve the time
of the courts; while estoppel in pais is of concern to the parties
alone, and arises out of the voluntary acts of one of the parties
to a controversy. This latter sort of estoppel originated in
equity, and, as enforced by the courts, operates to prevent one
who has induced others to rely on his acts from pursuing a
remedy which denies them. Since estoppel in pais is entirely
for the protection of those entitled to call for its enforcement,
it is a personal right which may be lost either by failing to set
it up properly, or by voluntary waiver; and, in contrast to res
judicata, no principle of public policy is involved.
Some courts, however, overlook the distinction, stating broadly
that a party may waive the defense of res judicata, or may, by
his acts, be estopped to set it up. A Maryland case goes so
far as to say: 56
"It cannot be doubted that a party in whose favor a decree
or judgment has been rendered can waive the defense he would
be authorized to make against another suit for the same cause
of action."
In a Kentucky case, 7 a former judgment had been given for
the defendant. Sometime thereafter he acknowledged that
plaintiff's claim against him was just and promised to pay it;
but no new consideration passed. Subsequently, plaintiff began
a second action on the same demand, and, owing to defendant's
new promise and the moral obligation supposed to be involved,
the court refused to view the former judgment as a bar. Of
a similar nature, in respect to the question of res judicata, are
decisions to the effect that, in the second proceeding, a plead-
ing to the merits, a submission on agreed facts, a consent to
go to trial, or an admission of record inconsistent with the prior
judgment, is a waiver of the right to raise the issue of res
judicata.58 In the same category, also, are cases which hold
of the state of the record; but these cases also may be explained without
doing violence to the public policy basis of res judicata. By the time a
case, in which issues previously determined have been re-tried, reaches the
appellate court, much of the harm has been done which an application
of res judicata would have prevented. The time of the court has been
consumed, and it may well be argued that public policy would not bo
served by permitting such a tardy raising of the question.
56See Fledderman v. Fledderman, 112 Md. 226, 246, 76 At]. 85, 89
(1910); cf. also Cherokee Nation v. United States, 270 U. S. 476, 46 Sup.
Ct. 428 (1926); Pratt v. Wilcox Mfg. Co., 64 Fed. 589 (C. C. N. D. Ill.
1893).
7 Cook v. Vimont, 6 T. B. Mon. 284 (Ky. 1827); of. also Fledderman
v. Fledderman, supra note 56; McCarthy v. Sleight, 114 Mich. 182, 72 N.
W. 165 (1897).
5s Hill v. City of Huron, 39 S. D. 530, 165 N. W. 534 (1917); M c-
Arthur v. Oliver, 53 Mich. 299, 19 N. W. 5 (1884); House v. Lockwood,
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that, if a defendant fails to object to the splitting of a cause
of action, and answers to the merits, he is estopped from sub-
sequently pleading or proving, as a bar to an action for the
remainder,"' the previous judgment.
The decisions mentioned in the preceding paragraph must be
classed as departures from the proper theory that res judicata
is a rule of public policy. There is, however, another type of
case which, while also holding that there may be waiver or
estoppel to prevent the setting up of a former judgment, is
not inconsistent with the public-policy theory of res judicata.
In this latter line of cases, the question of res judicata arises,
not in a second, but in a third or subsequent suit, involving the
same issues as were previously adjudged between the parties./'
In such a situation, where the party entitled to rest on res
judicata had an opportunity to avail himself of that defense in
the second proceeding, but failed to take advantage of it, he will
not thereafter be permitted to plead the original judgment, if
such judgment is contrary to that entered in the second suit,
and thus disturb the new determination of the question w.hichx
he has, by his own inaction, allowed to be made.
Since the doctrine of res judicata affects principally issues
of fact, a natural inquiry arises as to whether there is any neces-
sity that the former judgment be based on actual contest of
such issues; there is no requirement of this Idnd. If, for in-
stance, facts alleged are formally admitted in the course of a
judicial proceeding, they are thereby established against the
party who made the admission, with the same effect as if found
by a jury after a contest.0 ' Cases of formal admissions present
few difficulties, but when we come to constructive admissions,
and to the various judgments which may be rendered without
full litigation of facts, such as judgments on demurrer, nonsuits,
judgments on cases stated, and default judgments in general,
63 Hun 630, 17 N. Y. Supp. 817 (Sup. Ct. 1S92); Crumlish's Adm'r. v.
Shenandoah Val. R. R., 45 W. Va. 567, 32 S. E. 234 (1893); cf. also
Cooley v. Snake River Dist. Imp. Co., 78 Ore. 384, 152 Pac. 1190 (1915).
Contra: Bolen Coal Co. v. Whittaker Brick Co., 52 Kan. 747, 35 Pac. 810
(1894); People's Say. Bank v. Heath, 175 Mass. 131, 55 N. E. 807 (1900).
59 "Splitting of the cause of action amounts to nothing if the party
affected thereby consents to it." See Edmonston v. Jones, 96 Mio. App.
83, 91, 69 S. W. 741, 743 (1902); cf. Louisville Bridge Co. v. Louisville
& N. R. R, 116 Ky. 258, 75 S. W. 285 (1903); Burritt v. Belfy, 47
Conn. 323 (1879).
6 Board of Directors of Chicago Theolog. Ser. v. People, 189 InI. 4309,
59 N. E. 977 (1901); Semple v. Ware, 42 Cal. 619 (1372); Borden v. Mc-
Namara, 20 N. D. 225, 127 N. W. 104 (1910).
63 Blair v. Bartlett, 75 N. Y. 150 (1878); McClellan v. Lewis, 35 Cal.




much diversity of opinion is found; though the authorities seem
to agree that a suit dismissed, on demurrer or otherwise, for
some formal or technical defect, such as misjoinder or non-
joinder of parties, 2 a mistaken form of action, 3 or premature
beginning of action, 4 is no bar to a subsequent suit on the same
cause of action. Judgments of the kinds indicated should be
considered as concluding only the technical points decided, unless
Lhey in fact go to the merits of the case.
A type of judgment which, though entered without the verdict
of a jury, is frequently claimed to be on the merits, is the judg-
ment on a demurrer to pleaded facts, particularly where the
ground of demurrer was either that the facts alleged were in-
sufficient to constitute a cause of action or a defense,02 or that
the pleadings demurred to revealed affirmatively a conclusive
fact or state of affairs which foreclosed the pleader's case,-
as, for instance, contributory negligence, or the bar of the stat-
ute of limitations,-, and thus questions of res judicata often
arise.
It is hardly necessary to say that, where a demurrer is sus-
tained on substantial (untechnicalD grounds, such as those last
suggested, and where no leave to amend is given, the defeated
party is out of court, as he has averred an inadequate cause or de-
fense, and, under such circumstances, the judgment entered
against him is final, and as conclusive as though on the merits.
If, on the other hand, a demurrer is overruled, without per-
mission to plead over, the demurrant stands as one who has
not pleaded at all, and final judgment may be entered against
62 St. Romes v. Levee Steam Cotton Press Co., 127 U. S. 614, 8 Sup.
Ct. 1335 (1888); Wills v. Pauly, 116 Cal. 575, 48 Pac. 709 (1897); Rich-
ardson v. Richards, 36 Minn. 111, 30 N. W. 457 (1886); 2 FREEMAN, op.
cit. supra note 30, § 738.
63 Chicago Terminal R. R. v. Winslow, 216 Ill. 166, 74 N. E. 815 (1905);
Detrick v. Sharrar, 95 Pa. 521 (1880); Kleinschmidt v. Binzel, 14 Mont,
31, 35 Pac. 460 (1894); Meredith Mech. Ass'n v. American Twist Drill
Co., 67 N. H. 450, 39 Atl. 330 (1893); 2 FHm"N, op. cit. supra note 30,
§ 734.
64 Maxwell v. Clarke, 139 Mass. 112, 29 N. E. 224 (1885); Scheelino v.
Moshier, 172 Cal. 565, 158 Pac. 222 (1916); 2 FREEMAN, op. Cit. supra note
30, § 739.
as Terry v. Hammonds, 47 Cal. 32 (1873); Gould v. Evansville & C. R.
R., 91 U. S. 526 (1875); Lamb v. McConkey, 76 Iowa 47, 40 N. W. 77
(1888); 2 BLACK, JUDGMENTS § 709. Story, J., in Gilman v. Rives, 10
Pet. 298, 302 (U. S. 1836), makes a statement which is apparently con-
trary to the principle involved in the above cases, but an examination
of the report of the decision shows that the former judgment there in-
volved had been on a demurrer for non-joinder of parties, a technical de-
fect only.
66 Corrugated Culvert Co. v. Simpson Tp., 51 Okla. 178, 151 Pac. 854
(1915); Hodge v. Atlantic Coast Lumber Corp., 90 S. C. 229, 11 S. E.
1009 (1911); Cooley v. Maine, 183 Iowa 560, 165 N. W. 1015 (1918).,
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him accordingly; unless such a judgment be reversed, the cause
of action is thereby concluded. This is the true foundation of
the judgment against demurrant; though it is common to assert
that a defeated demurrant is concluded because he has admitted
all the properly pleaded facts and has lost on issues of law.G7
If, for the sake of conforming with time-honored judicial ex-
pression, the theory of admissions be employed to support the
conclusiveness of the judgment against demurrant, then the
principle should be fully understood that a demurrant admits
properly alleged facts for purposes of the argument, and to that
end alone; but, since there is in no true sense an admission
of facts by demurrer, it would be better not to speak of facts
admitted at all. The real effect of the demurrant's action is
to say, "Even if I should admit the facts alleged, still there is
no cause of action set forth," rather than, "I admit the facts."
This must be true, for if a demurrant is permitted to plead
over, he may deny the allegations of the pleading to which he
demurred; whereas, if his demurrer were a complete admission,
this could not be done.
Another instance of a conclusive judgment on demurrer is
one against a defendant whose demurrer to plaintiff's averments
of fact has been overruled with leave to answer, and who has
not availed himself of that privilege. Such a demurrant is
left with no ground to stand upon, and, having had his oppor-
tunity, he ought not to be given additional chance at the ex-
pense of time belonging to litigants in other cases. This last
mentioned class of cases stands somewhat by itself; judgments
entered under such circumstances should not only be accounted
as decisions on the merits, but should bar future litigation of
the same cause both as to the issues raised in the first case and
also as to all issues of fact that might there have been pleaded
by defendant, for since he failed to take advantage of an express
opportunity to state his case, the law will assume he had none
to plead.
Decisions may be found c which permit one against whom
final judgment has been entered on demurrer, because of the
insufficiency of facts averred, to renew his action on a declara-
tion containing a more complete statement of facts; and this
6rBissell v. Spring Valley Twp., 124 U. S. 225, 8 Sup. Ct. 495 (188);
Aurora City v. West, 7 Wall. 82 (U. S. 1863), and ca-es there cited;
Kleinschmidt v. Benzel, supra note 63.
6s Gould v. Evansville & C. R. R., supra note 65; Terry v. Hammonds,
supra note 65; Newhall v. Hatch, 134 Cal. 269, 00 Pac. 266 (1901); Hey-
man Cohen & Sons v. M. Lurie Woolen Co., 232 N. Y. 112, 133 X. E.
370 (1921); Moore v. Dunn, 41 Ohio SL 62 (1834); Detrick v. Sharrar,
supra note 63; 2 FnmmN, op. cit. mtpra note 30, § 747. Contra: Lamb
v. McConkey, supra note 65; Corrugated Culvert Co. Simpson Tp., aupra
note 66.
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is so even where the new matter set up was pertinent to and
available in the first action. Such decisions attempt to explain
themselves on the untenable ground that the second declaration
avers a cause of action which had never been passed upon, not-
withstanding the fact that the pleading in question really deals
with the same facts as set forth in the first declaration, though
more fully stated. These cases say in effect that there was no
judgment on the merits in the first suit, because there was no
cause before the court concerning which its judgment could be-
come res judicata,6 or they say that a judgment on demurrer
is not, after all, a judgment on the merits, but simply a decision
that the particular pleading attacked did not entitle the pleader
to proceed. When, however, a final judgment is entered on such
grounds against a pleader who has had full opportunity to state
his case, he should no more be allowed to consume the time of
the courts in further experiments to enforce the same cause
of action or defense than is the person against whom judgment
has been rendered on a verdict.
Immediately heretofore we have been dealing with the effect
of demurrer judgments in subsequent proceedings brought on
the same cause of action, and in this class of cases, aside from
the problem as to whether the prior judgment can properly be
accounted as on the merits, usually no great difficulty is en-
countered in applying the principles of res judicata. Where
the cause of action is the same in two suits, a judgment in the
first of them, which may properly be accounted a judgment on
the merits, is conclusive in the second, whether such judgment
was entered on a demurrer or otherwise; but this is otherwise
in a subsequent suit, in spite of its being between the same
parties, if such suit turns on a different cause of action, even
though soihe of the issues be identical in both" cases. As pre-
viously explained, when in the second suit the cause of action
differs from that in the prior one, a judgment entered in such
prior suit can have the force of res judicata in the second one
only as to facts actually admitted, and such points as were
raised and adjudged as issues in the prior proceeding; and since
no facts are actually admitted by, or issues of fact determined
on, demurrer, where the cause of action is not the same in both
suits a demurrer judgment lacks the force of res judicata so
far as such facts or issues are concerned. While such a judg-
ment may have concluded the original cause of action, it was
not on the theory of distinct facts actually admitted or of specific
issues raised and adjudged; 70 judgments on demurrer are en-
69 None of this discussion is applicable to judgments on demurrers to
declarations which affirmatively disclose a fatal defect in the case, such
as contributory negligence or statute of limitations.
70 "A judgment by default only admits for the purpose of the action
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tered either because the pleading under attack fails to set forth
a case or defense, or because it does so defectively, and thereby
no issues of fact are determined so as to make them res judicata
in a subsequent suit on a different cause of action. The dis-
tinctions here noted should not be lost sight of, though they
apparently have been by some courts,71 which proceed on the
theory that so-called admissions made by demurrer in a former
suit are conclusive of like issues of fact involved in a subsequent
suit, even though the cause of action be not the same. Failure
of the courts when dealing with demurrer judgments to recog-
nize the distinctions here indicated, and a careless use of lan-
guage as to admissions, have led to much unnecessary judicial
discussion, and, in some cases, to improper conclusions.
All that has been said up to this point of judgments on
demurrer, concerns demurrers to pleadings. Judgments on
properly directed verdicts,72 and those on demurrers to evi-
dence, 73 are always final, constituting res judicata in subsequent
actions as fully as judgments entered on jury verdicts. Like-
wise, judgments entered on default, for want of an appearance,
for want of an affidavit of defense, or for want of a sufficient
affidavit of defense, usually make a case res judicata as fully
as do judgments after complete litigation.-'  A number of de-
cisions, however, except from the operation of this latter rule
matters which, although available as a defense, might also have
been made the basis of an independent cross suit; -r according
to these rulings, the default judgment does not bar a subsequent
suit based on such matters.
the legality of the demand or claim in suit: it does not mahe the allega-
tions of the declaration or complaint evidence in an action upon a difffrcnt
claim." Field, J., in Cromwell v. County of Sac, aupra note 47, at 36
(1876).
71 Aurora City v. West, supra note 67, at 99 ct scq.
72 Oscanyan v. Arms Co., 103 U. S. 261 (1SSO); Johnson v. Elwood, 50
N. Y. 614 (1S74); Nauyalis v. Philadelphia Coal & Ice Co., 270 Fed. 93
(C. C. A. 2d, 1920); Watson Co. v. Citizens Concrete Co., 28 R. I. 472, CS
Atl. 310 (1907) ; McCown v. Muldrow, 91 S. C. 523, 74 S. E. 38 (1912);
34 C. J. 801.
7zBliss v. Philadelphia R. T. Co., 73 Pa. Super. 173 (1927); Hunt v.
Terril's Heirs, 7 J. J. Marsh 67 (Ky. 1831); 34 C. J. 801. Cont7a: Hanna
v. Alluvial Farm Co., 79 Ore. 557, 156 Pac. 265 (1916).
7,Stradley v. Bath Portland Cement Co., 22S Pa. 10S, 77 AtI. 212
(1910); Lamon v. Rodgers, 42 Pa. Super. 437 (1910); Last Chance Min.
Co. v. Tyler Min. Co., 157 U. S. 683, 15 Sup. Ct. 733 (1895); Third Nat.
Bank v. Atlantic City, 130 Fed. 751 (C. C. A. 3d, 1904); Reid v. Holmcz,
127 Mass. 326 (1873); Jarvis v. Driggs, 69 N. Y. 143 (1877); Leonard
v. Simpson, 2 Bing. N. C. 176 (1835).
75 Riley v. Hale, 158 Mass. 240, 33 N. E. 491 (1803); Litch v. Clinch,
136 Ill. 410, 26 N. E. 579 (1891); Gerber Co. v. Thompson, 34 W. Va.
721, 100 S. E. 733 (1919); Campbell v. Martin, S9 Vt. 214, 95 Atl. 494
(1915).
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When we come to the field of nonsuits, and consider their
relation to res judicata, the decisions are by no means uniform,
nor the judicial opinions in their support satisfactory; but it
seems commonly conceded that a compulsory nonsuit, without
more, cannot be pleaded or treated as res judicata of either
the general ciuse of action or of the facts or issues involved."
Even where the record shows a motion to remove a compulsory
nonsuit, and an appealable judgment of refusal entered thereon,
though some courts seem to think this state of affairs sufficient
to constitute res judicata, we find no decisive utterance" on
the point until a recent opinion by the Supreme Court of Penn-
sylvania 78 where it was squarely ruled that a judgment refusing
76 Cleary v. Quaker City Cab Co., 285 Pa. 241, 132 Atl. 185 (1926),
and cases there cited; Manhattan Life Ins. Co. v. Broughton, 109 U. S.
121, 3 Sup. Ct. 99 (1883); United States v. Parker, 120 U. S. 89, 7 Sup.
Ct. 454 (1887); Audubon v. Excelsior Ins. Co., 27 N. Y. 216 (1863).
The result is that the nonsuited plaintiff, who has had greater opportunity
to present his whole case than one whose declaration has been held bad
on demurrer may renew the action without change, while the overruled
demurrant may not. There are a few statements made to the effect that
a compulsory nonsuit does not adjudge anything on the merits. Gummor
v. Trustees of Village of Omro, 50 Wis. 247, 253 (1880); Bliss v. Phila-
delphia R. T. Co., supra note 73, at 177; 2 BLAcK, op. cit. supra note 65,
§ 699. The more common explanation given in these cases, however, is
that, since no judgment can be given for the plaintiff if defendant's mo-
tion for nonsuit is overruled, it would not be fair to permit final judg-
ment against the plaintiff if the motion is sustained; that if the defendant
wants a final judgment, he must demur to the evidence or go to the jury,
and thus risk having judgment given against himself. Protests against
the prevailing rule on the effect of nonsuits are to be found. Fitzpatrick
v. Riley, 163 Pa. 65, 29 At. 783 (1894). Decisions contrary to
it are rare. Cartin v. South Bound R. R., 43 S. C. 221, 20 S. E. 979
(1894); Ordway v. Boston & l. R. R., 69 N. H. 429, 45 Atl. 243 (1898).
The opinion in the last-mentioned case analyzes the nature of compulsory
nonsuits, and holds that they have the same effect as res judicata. as
judgments on demurrers to evidence, and says that the contrary or majority
view is based on an erroneous analogy drawn between compulsory non-
suits and the common-law voluntary nonsuit; but this is contrary to the
generally accepted view.
'1 See Cleary v. Quaker City Cab Co., supra note 76, and cases there
cited. But in Mason v. Kansas City Belt Ry. Co., 226 Mo. 212, 125 S. W.
1128 (1910), a judgment refusing to remove a nonsuit was held not to
constitute res judicata under the Missouri statutes. In Morgan v. Bliss,
2 Mass. 111 (1806), and Fleming v. Insurance Co., 12 Pa. 391 (1849),
involuntary nonsuits which the court had refused to take off were held
not to constitute res judicata, but there is no discussion in these cases
of the effect of the refusal to remove. On the other hand, in Ordway v.
Boston & Maine R. R., supra note 76, where the former nonsuit was held
to constitute res judicata, the fact that the plaintiff's "exception" to the
nonsuit had been considered and "overruled" is not discussed in deter-
mining the effect as res judicata.
7.Fine v. Soifer, 288 Pa. 164, 135 Atl. 742 (1927).
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to remove a nonsuit, unless reversed on appeal, is conclusive
of the plaintiff's case, effectively barring the maintenance of
another suit on the same cause; and thit, the plaintiff having
chosen to follow this procedure instead of beginning a new suit,
as he was at liberty to do, thereby submitted his case for final
decision.
Voluntary nonsuits present no problems of res judicata; they
are suffered at the instance of the plaintiff, and before a verdict
has been rendered or any judgment or order of the court en-
tered which would dispose of the case. Nothing, therefore, has
been adjudicated, and the principles of res judicata cannot
apply.79
Judgments entered on an agreed statement of facts are within
the doctrine of res judicata. The force of a case stated is
essentially the same as that of a special verdict; one is estab-
lished by the deliberations of a jury, the other by agreement
of the parties. In the case stated there is a real and formal
admission of facts, as distinguished from the so-called admis-
sions that follow in the wake of a demurrer. When, therefore,
a judgment is pronounced on such a foundation, the cause should
become res judicata as completely as though a verdict had been
rendered by a jury. The facts have been admitted and adjudi-
cated; public policy forbids the parties later to reopen the
matter and contradict their former admissions. This is the
foundation of the better considered cases."
True, judicial utterances may be found contrary to the views
just expressed concerning the conclusiveness of judgments on
agreed facts; most of such pronouncements, however, are simply
dicta,s2 since they appear in opinions where the second action
involved different parties from those in the prior suit. As to
the suggestion in these cases that "circumstances may be con-
ceded as exsting to raise a question of law, without intending
to admit them as true, and even without believing them," c-2 that
79 Gardner v. Mich. Cent. R. R., 150 U. S. 349, 14 Sup. Ct. 140 (1S93);
Township of Moreland %. Gordner, 109 Pa. 116 (1885); Honsinger v.
Union Carriage & Gear Co., 175 N. Y. 229, 67 N. E. 436 (1903); Burrell
v. Burrell, 10 Mlass. 221 (1813); Ensign v. Bartholomew, 42 Maso. 274
(1840).
so MI'Lughan v. Bovard, 4 Watts 308 (Pa. 1835); Darlington v. Gray,
5 Whart. 487 (Pa. 1840); State Hospital v. Consolidated Water Co., ,Z:pra
iiote 3; Fendick v. Lloyd, 50 Pa. Super. 435 (1912).
S1 See Hart's Appeal, 8 Pa. 32, 37 (1848); Gibson v. Rowland, 35 Pa.
Super. 158, 165 (1908). That the statements in these cases are dicta is
pointed out in State v. Consolidated Water Co., -apra note 5, at 39, 110
Atl. at 284.
S2 Hart's Appeal, Gibson v. Rowland, both supra note 81. A similar eC-
pression is used in MI'Lughan v. Bovard, supra note 80, but it was made
in connection with a ease stated that had been withdrawn bkfore any
judgment was entered upon it.
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is the situation where a demurrer is interposed, for there the
acts of the' parties are hostile, but the proposition has no place
where the parties are in agreement; otherwise the courts would
render merely advisory opinions.
It may be well to note at this point, that the so-called declara-
tory judgments which, through recent legislation, have come intt
vogue in American jurisdictions, are more than advisory. As
stated by the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania,8' 3 in a late opinion
reviewing the law upon the subject of such judgments:
"Since the numerous jurisdictions enjoying this practice all
hold that a real controversy must exist, that moot cases will
not be considered, and that declaratory judgments are res
judicata of the points involved, such judgments cannot properly
be held merely advisory,... ; declaratory judgments [have] the
effect of making the issues at stake res judicata, and, in this
important sense, such judgments are forever enforcible."
While the effect of declaratory judgments as res judicata, is,
in a sense, new to American law, and no doubt time will require
the courts to pass on aspects of the matter which have not
yet presented themselves, nevertheless, it can be said in a general
way that declaratory judgments seem to be well within the doc-
trine of res judicata.
At common law, perhaps the most outstanding exception to
the doctrine of res judicata was to be found in the rule which
prevailed in an action of ejectment; it was settled that a
judgment in such an action was no bar to later proceedings
between the same parties, for the same land, and based on
the same claim of title. The explanation is historical and pro-
cedural. Common-law ejectment was but a possessory action;
although it was generally necessary for the plaintiff (always
claiming as a lessee ousted of his term) to prove his lessor's
title, in order to validate his own claim as a lessee. Yet the
authorities considered that title was drawn into question only
collaterally, "the direct question being the plaintiff's right to
immediate possession," and that whatever might be incidentally
determined as to title was not res judicata in a second eject-
ment. Such second action was esseiitial to actual recovery of
the land, and therein a new demise was supposed.8- 4 Moreover,
in this form of action nominal parties were used, and they were
different in the second suit. The retention of these fictions, with
others, was an additional reason for not applying res judicata.
When, particularly in America, ejectment ceased to be a purely
83 See Kariher's Petition, 284 Pa. 455, 464, 469, 131 At]. 265, 268, 270
(1925).
84 Stevens v. Hughes, 31 Pa. 381 (1858).
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possessory action,5 title became a real fact at issue. Some
courts welcomed an opportuni t to hold that the old right of
successive suits was lost, but others hesitated about taldng this
step and left it for the legislatures to make the break with the
past.s0 Now, judgments in actions to try title, by whatever
name they may be called, are generally final, and constitute res
judicata.
So far, we have been dealing in the main with civil cases, but
the principles of res judicata apply in successive criminal pro-
ceedings against the same defendant, involving the same facts,
practically as in civil suits. This is a different thing from the
force of the doctrines of former jeopardy, and of aitrcfois acquit
or autrefois convict; those doctrines operate to prevent renewed
prosecutions for the same offense; res judicata is of vider effect;
it prevents retrial of facts, even though the offenses in which
they figure are differently denominated.57 Thus, an acquittal on
an indictment for the specific offense of furnishing liquor on
Sundays was held to bar proof on a subsequent trial of an-
other indictment, which charged the same defendant with selling
liquor to intoxicated persons on those particular Sundays.5
Facts litigated in civil actions are not. res judicata in subsequent
criminal proceedings, and vice versa. 0 The reason is obvious;
85 A thorough discussion of the subject is contained in the opinion of
Sawyer, J., in Caperton v. Schmidt, 26 Cal. 479 (1864). Cf. also Campbell
v. Rankin, 99 U. S. 261 (1878); Note (1864) 85 Am. Dec. 20S.
SGFor example, in Pennsylvania an act of 1S07 [Pa. Laws (Dunlop,
1847) 201] provided that two verdicts and judgments thereon in ejcctment,
in favor of one party, should be conclusive, and it was not until 1901
[PA- STAr. (1922) §§ 9407, 9403] that one verdict and judgment was
made final. It had there long been the rule, however, that one judgment in
ejectment based on an equitable title was conclusive. Winpcnny v. Win-
penny, 92 Pa. 440 (1880). Cf. Sanford v. Herron, 101 Mlo. 176, 61 S. 11.
839 (1901); Crockett v. Lashbrook, 5 T. B. Mon. 531 (Ky. 1027).
87 Altenburg v. Commonwealth, 126 Pa. 602, 17 At. 799 (iSS9); Com-
monwealth v. Greevy, 75 Pa. Super. 110 (1920); Commonwealth v. Ellis,
160 Mlass. 165, 35 N. E. 773 (1893); In re Food Conservation Act, 254
Fed. 893 (N. D. N. Y. 1918). An exception to this is made where offcn':C3
charged in the original and later indictments involve differcnt ctandards
of proof. Thus the former conviction of a crime, which defendant under
oath had denied committing, was held not to be res judicata in a -ubqucnt
prosecution for perjury, where the original crime could be provd by one
'witness but two were required to convict of perjury. State v. Sargood,
80 Vt. 415, 68 Atl. 49 (1905), and cases there cited.
ss Altenburg v. Commonwealth, sz:pra note 87.
89Hahn v. Bealor, 132 Pa. 242, 19 At. 74 (IS90); Wingrove v. Cent.
Pa. Tract. Co., 237 Pa. 549, 85 Atl. 850 (1912); of. Chantangco v. Abaroa,
218 U. S. 476, 31 Sup. Ct. 34 (1910); Stone v. United States, 167 U. S.
178, 17 Sup. Ct. 778 (1897); Murphy v. United States, 272 U. S. 62,0, .47
Sup. Ct. 218 (1926); Sims v. Sims, 75 N. Y. 466 (1878); "W4 C. J. 570.
The case of Petrie v. Nuttal, 11 Ex. 569 (1850), holds that a former
conviction cannot be set up as a plea in bar, but intimates that it would
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usually the parties are not the same, and speaking generally res
judicata applies only as between the same parties and their
privies; in addition, as between criminal and civil cases, in most
instances different standards of evidence and proof are involved.
The records of criminal trials are at times accepted as evi-
dence in civil actions, and conversely, on issues which involve
facts that were previously involved in the rendition of the judg-
ments shown by the records in question, but in such instances
they are received simply as containing evidence, not as con-
clusive in themselves; " and, in order to be admissible at all,
they must generally be presented as in some way constituting
proof of admissions. For example, records may be offered as
containing pleas of guilty.91 Then, there are instances where
records of judgments were offered in evidence by the persons
against whom they were held to operate as res judicata02
In an interesting case, 3 decided in 1921, by the Supreme Court
of Pennsylvania, the defendant had first been charged with
murder, "of which crime he was tried and acquitted; subse-
quently he was indicted for involuntary manslaughter in killing
the same person, of which offense he was convicted." Sentence
was imposed by the trial court; the defendant appealed to the
superior court, which reversed; the Commonwealth appealed to
be admissible in evidence to prove the facts upon which it is based. The
disfavor with which the court views the established rule is obvious in
this case. Of. Dorrell v. State, 83 -Ind. 357 (1882), where, in a criminal
prosecution for trespass, conclusive force as to the location of a boundary
line is given to a former judgment in an action of ejectment between the
prosecuting witness and the defendant in the criminal case. United States
v. Baltimore & 0. R. R., 229 U. S. 244, 33 Sup. Ct. 850 (1912), is also
cited as opposed to the prevailing rule, but it can scarcely be so classified,
for the decision is not that the former bill in equity had established facts
conclusively, but that it had determined defendant's rights under the
law. The case is, therefore, one involving stare decisis rather than res
judicata.
The mere fact; that one action is civil and one criminal in form is not
always sufficient to determine the admissibility of the record of the prior
one. Thus, an action to enforce penalties or forfeitures consequent upon
a crime charged in a former proceeding although civil in form, is re-
garded as part of the criminal prosecution, and the conviction or acquit-
tal constitutes res judicata. Coffey v. U. S., 116 U. S. 436; In re Food
Conservation Act, supra note 87.
DO Sims v. Sims, supra note 89; Markett v. Gemke, 154 N. Y. Supp.
780 (Sup. Ct. 1915); Anders v. Clover, 198 Mich. 763, 165 N. W. 640
(1917); Spain v. Oregon-Washington Ry. & Nay. Co., 78 Ore. 355, 153
Pac. 470 (1915).
91 Stewart v. Stewart, 93 N. J. Eq. 1, 114 At]. 851 (1921); Markett v.
Gemke, Anders v. Clover, both supra note 90.
92Moses v. Bradley, 3 Whart. 272 (Pa. 1838);" Porter v. Seiler, 23 Pa.
424 (1854).
O Commonwealth v. Greevy, supra note 87, at 101, 114 Atl. at 513.
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the supreme court, which set aside the reversal and affirmed the
sentence. There was no question in the case as to defendant's
having killed the deceased; but in answer to the indictment for
manslaughter the accused contended that his lack of legal guilt
was res judicata by force of the prior judgment on the murder'
indictment. In disposing of defendant's contention of res
judicata, the supreme court said:
"Res judicata conclusively determines not only the ultimate
facts established by a . . . judgment, but every other fact
necessarily found in reaching the conclusion as to that ultimate
fact; but that does not mean . . . that every defence [inter-
posed in the first case, i.e. the murder trial, was] established ....
Nor does it follow that because the evidence is the same in
the two cases,-even if we assume there was not the slightest
differencey-that the defeating of one action concludes also the
other. In each case there was an inference to be drawn by the
jury from the evidence. To convict in the first it would have had
to infer an intent to wound or kill, -which it refused to do; to
convict in the second it had to infer there was no intent to wound
or kill, which it did . . . The inference in each case, however,
was for the jury, not for the court; and the fact that the evi-
dence was the same in each, does not alter this, but, on the con-
trary, strengthens the conclusion of the accuracy of the last find-
ing, since two juries, on the same evidence, seem to have reached
a like conclusion, viz., that there was a reckless or careless kill-
ing and not an intentional one."
Under the law of Pennsylvania, where an indictment for mur-
der does not include the charge of involuntary manslaughter, a
finding of reckless or careless, not intentional, killing would ac-
quit of murder, but such a finding would constitute the basis for
a conviction of involuntary manslaughter; so that, though other
facts, such as the killing having taken place, identity of persons,
etc., might have been conclusively determined in the first trial,
yet the vital one as to the defendant's intent was not,--hence
the judgment on the verdict there rendered was unavailable, un-
der a plea of res judicata, to force an acquittal at the second
trial.
Attempts to apply the doctrine of res judicata in habeas cor-
pus proceedings have brought it into conflict with some time-
honored principles peculiarly attached to this writ. Habeas
corpus is designed to afford the individual the fullest opportunity
to be free from illegal restraint of his person, and application of
the principles of res judicata, necessarily including the rule
that what might have been litigated before is barred in a later
proceeding on the same cause of action, would be a harsh re-
striction on the principles of this great writ. A person illegally
detained might very easily, on his first writ, fail to make out
a case, and to deprive him of all right to apply again, on other
32,7
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grounds, for his freedom, would not comport with the spirit of
habeas corpus. Then, at common law, habeas corpus was not
an action; it was a summary proceeding from which no appeal
lay,914 and it early became settled that the refusal to discharge
on habeas corpus did not bar subsequent applications, whether
on the same or on additional facts.9 5 A leading English case
went so far as to say, "The defendant has the right to the opin-
ion of every court as to the propriety of his imprisonment." 11
At the present time, in many jurisdictions, as the result of
statutes or of judicial decisions, appeals are permitted in habeas
corpus proceedings; °1 and the courts of some of these jurisdic-
tions,-arguing that the privilege to appeal adequately protects
the rights of those restrained of their liberty,-have held that
repeated applications for discharge will no longer be allowed. 9
Others adhere to the old doctrine, saying, however, that the
granting of the second writ is within the discretion of the court,
which is not bound by, but may give weight to, the former denial
of discharge.09
Varying conclusions have been reached by the courts concern-
ing the effect, as res judicata, of a discharge on habeas corpus.
Speaking generally, where the question is the liability to a sec-
ond arrest for the same cause, it may be said that the first pro-
ceeding is res judicata as to all matters there determined; but
this does not necessarily mean that it is a bar to a second arrest.
If the discharge is in a preliminary proceeding, such as extra-
dition, or holding for trial by a committing magistrate, where
94 Cox v. Hakes, 15 App. Cas. 506 (1890); Russell v. Commonwealth,
1 Penr. & W. 82 (Pa. 1829); Clark v. Commonwealth, 29 Pa. 129 (1858);
Bradley v. Beetle, 153 Mass. 154, 26 N. E. 429 (1891); In re Waller, 234
S. W. 866 (Mo. App. 1921).
05 Ex parte Partington, 13 M. & W. 679 (1845); Cox v. Hakes, azpra
note 94; In re Snell, 31 Minn. 110, 16 N. W. 692 (1883); People v. Brady,
56 N. Y. 182; In re Waller, supra note 94; Matter of Perkins, 2 Cal. 424
(1852); Matter of Ring, 28 Cal. 247 (1865).
9 8Ex parte Partington, supra note 95, at 684.
¢5 STAT. 539 (1842); 28 U. S. C. § 462 (1926); Cuddy Petitioner, 131
U. S. 280, 9 Sup. Ct. 703 (1889); In re Neagle, 135 U. S. 1, 10 Sup. Ct.
658 (1889); Ex parte Hamilton, 65 Miss. 98, 3 So. 68 (1887); State v.
Witcher, 117 Wis. 668, 94 N. W. 787 (1903); Doyle v. Commonwealth, 107
Pa. 20 (1884); Commonwealth v. Butler, 19 Pa. Super. 626 (1902); Com-
monwealth v. Cairns, 46 Pa. Super. 96 (1911).
08 Perry v. McLendon, 62 Ga. 598 (1879) ; McMahon v. Mead, 30 S. D.
515, 139 N. W. 122 (1912); State v. Witcher, Ex. parte Hamilton, both
supra note 97; Petition of Moebus, 74 N. H. 213, 66 Atl. 641 (1907); of.
Ex parte Moebus, 148 Fed. 39 (C. C. D. N. H. 1906).
') Salinger v. Loisel, 265 U. S. 224, 44 Sup. Ct. 519 (1923); Wong Doe
v. United States, 265 U. S. 239, 44 Sup. Ct. 524 (1923); Ex parte Lawr-
ence, 5 Binn. 304 (Pa. 1812); Commonwealth v. Biddle, 4 Clark 35 (Pa.
1846); of. Ex parte Justus, 26 0kla. 101, 110 Pac. 907 (1910); People v.
Lamb, 118 N. Y. Supp 389 (Sup. Ct. 1909).
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there is no consideration of the merits, this is no bar to a
later arrest for the same cause of complaint, under a different
process; "'l on the other hand, in most jurisdictions, a prisoner
discharged on habeas corpus after a hearing where the merits
of the case are fully passed upon, is entitled to plead res judicata
in bar of subsequent arrest." '
Again, in suits for false imprisonment, brought by one who has
been discharged on habeas corpus against the person who
caused his wrongful detention, if the defendant in such suit had
previously been given opportunity to contest the hab2as corpus
proceeding, the discharge becomes res judicata in respect to the
wrongfulness of the detention, for purposes of recovering dam-
ages for the false imprisonment."1,2
Another point for consideration is: to what general character
of judgments, orders, and decrees does the rule of res judicata
apply? It may be said, in a broad way, to cover judgments and
decrees of courts of record, in equity as well as at law,"'V 3 and also
judgments of justices of the peace or magistrates, "' and the or-
ders of referees in bankruptcy,' when these several tribunals
act within the scope of their respective jurisdictions; but we find
at the present day a rapidly increasing number of governmental
administrative boards to which various duties of a quasi-judicial
nature are frequently assigned. These bodies hear and weigh
testimony, make findings of fact, apply the law thereto, and en-
ter orders and awards. Ought such orders and awards to have
the same force of res judicata as is accorded to judgments of
actual courts? If a board or commission, acting within its juris-
diction, makes a determination which is judicial in its nature,
and final in substance and form, there is no substantial reason
for giving it less effect as res judicata in the field of fact than
would be accorded the judgment of a court; for, the matter hav-
ing been litigated before the body appointed by law to pass upon
it, unless the legislature, in creating that body indicated a differ-
Moo Ex parte Milburn, 9 Pet. 704 (U. S. 1835); Bcnson v. Palmer, 31
App. D. C. 561 (1908); Commonwealth v. Hall, 75 Mass. 22 (1857);
State v. Fley, 2 Brev. 338 (S. C. 1809); Kurtz v. State, 22 Fla. 36 (183G).
'10 United States v. Chung Shee, 71 Fed. 277 (S. D. Cal. 1895); Mc-
Conologue's Case, 107 Mass. 154 (1871) ; Ex parte Jilz, 64 Mo. 205 (1S76).
10,20%dord v. Berry, 204 Mich. 197, 170 N. W. 83 (1918); Turgeon v.
Bean, 109 Me. 189, 83 Ati. 557 (1912); State v. Huegin, 110 Wis. 1S9, 85
N. W. 1046 (1901); Zebley v. Storey, 117 Pa. 478, 12 At. 569 (1888).
Contra: Losaw v. Smith, 109 App. Div. 754, 96 N. Y. Supp. 191 (3d
Dep't 1905).
103 Larldns v. Lindsay, 205 Pa. 534, 55 Atl. 184 (1903).
104 Marsteller v. Mlarsteller, 132 Pa. 517, 19 Atl. 344 (1890); Gilboy v.
Duryea Borough, 228 Pa. 252, 77 Atl. 461 (1910); Blair v. Bartlett, cupra
note 61; 34 C. J. 878.
'10ziMcCulloch v. Davenport Savings Bank, 220 Fed. 309 (S. D. Iowa
1915).
YALE LAW JOURNAL
ent purpose, we may reasonably assume that the law-makers
intended final decisions on all matters of pure fact, within the
jurisdiction of the designated tribunal, to be conclusive, and,
at least to this extent, its orders should be res judicata. The
cases support this view.00 However, where a determination of
fact covers a point of law, such as a utility rate alleged to be
confiscatory, constitutional requirements may demand that the
facts involved shall be passed on by a court,107 and hence, pending
an appeal, a decision by a commission on such a point ought not
in any sense be given force as res judicata. Moreover, when
dealing with determinations of administrative bodies, it must al-
ways be remembered that these tribunals are purely statutory
and their powers and functions limited in each instance to the
legislative grant; in this connection, it will be found that, where
the orders of such bodies have been refused the force of res
judicata, it has generally been because of some statutory ob-
stacle.1 08 Frequently the particular actions of the boards or
commissions in question have been held not to be of a judicial
nature, and, for that reason not within the doctrine; 100 then, in
some statutes there are special provisions which are construed
to prevent the application of the doctrine of res judicata to the
order or award there dealt with. Of this latter nature is the
direction contained in the Act of Congress that, in suits to en-
force reparation orders made by the Interstate Commerce Com-
mission, such orders shall be only prima facie evidence of the
facts which they contain; ° upon this basis they are held not
to constitute res judicata."'
While the doctrine under consideration is accorded its great-
100 Pittsburgh & L. E. R. R. v. McKees Rocks, supra note 13; Love v.
Flahive, 205 U. S. 195, 27 Sup. Ct. 486 (1906); United States v. Burchard,
125 U. S. 176, 8 Sup. Ct. 832 (1888) ; Dennison v. Payne, supra note 43;
Hunnewell's Case, 220 Mass. 351, 107 N. E. 934 (1915); People v. Hall,
80 N. Y. 117 (1880); Longinette v. Shelton, 52 S. W. 1078 (Tenn. 1898);
Ard v. Pratt, 43 Kan. 419, 23 Pac. 646 (1890); Farm Inv. Co. v. Car-
penter, 9 Wyo. 110, 61 Pac. 258 (1900); Connecticut R. R. v. Bailey, 24
Vt. 465 (1852); Braley v. City of Barre, 88 Vt. 251, 92 Atl. 236 (1914);
24 AM. & ENG. ENCYc. LAW 723; 34 C. J. 759.
107 Ohio Valley Water Co. v. Ben Avon Borough, 253 U. S. 287, 40 Sup.
Ct. 527 (1920); Ben Avon Borough v. Ohio Valley Water Co., 271 Pa.
346, 114 Atl. 369 (1921).
108 Spiller v. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry., 253 U. S. 117, 40 Sup. Ct. 466
(1920) ; First Nat. Bank v. Hartford Ins. Co., 45 Conn. 22 (1877) ; Board
of Comm'rs v. Cypert, 65 Okla. 168, 166 Pac. 195 (1917); Custer County
v. Chicago, B. & Q. R. R., 62 Neb. 657, 87 N. W. 341 (1901).
1o Prentis v. Atlantic Coast L. Co., 211 U. S. 210, 29 Sup. Ct. 67 (1908)
Custer County v. Chicago, B. & Q. R. R., supra note 108; State v. Cecil
County, 54 Md. 426 (1880).
11034 STAT. 590 (1906), 36 STAT. .554 (1910), 49 U. S. C. § 16 (1926).
31" Spiller v. Atchison, T. & S. F. R. R., supra note 108.
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est force in the field of fact, yet, as before noted, under it, legal
questions necessarily involved in a cause of action determined by
a court, are concluded between the parties and their privies so
far as that particular cause of action is concerned; but we find a
number of decisions which, though recognizing the force of res
judicata to conclude issues of fact involved in the determination
of administrative boards or commissions, hold that their orders
are entirely inconclusive on questions of law.12 These decisions
are supported by sound reason. With the creation of adminis-
trative boards and commissions, the legislature usually provides
a statutory mode of review; sometimes this is by the courts, but
not infrequently the appeal is to a higher board or officer, and its
or his decision is declared to be final. Where this latter situation
eists, the rulings have been held inconclusive as to legal issues;
and, obviously, correctly so, for administrative boards and com-
missions cannot properly be accounted courts of law.1n On the
other hand, where an appeal to the courts is provided, their
judgments are conclusive in all respects. Moreover, if a party
does not avail himself of the right of appeal, the original order or
award should be accounted res judicata,114 just as though the ap-
peal had been taken and the order or award of the board or com-
mission affnimed. n5
It is a settled rule that where statutory modes of review are
established, the prescribed method must be followed, if relief
from the order of a special tribunal is sought; 2 although not
the same, this rule and res judicata are often discussed to-
gether." '7 Both bring about similar results in many instances,
but res judicata is the more far-reaching. For example, while
the rule as to following statutory methods of appeal prevents the
further consideration of the particular case except in the or-
dained way, the rule of res judicata applies not only in that case
but in all subsequent litigation between the same parties and
those claiming under them.
2-' Wisconsin Cent. R. R. v. Forsythe, 159 U. S. 46, 15 Sup. Ct. 1020
(1894); Buffalo Land Co. v. Strong, 91 Minn. 84, 97 N. W. 575 (1003),
aff'd, 203 U. S. 582, 27 Sup. Ct. 780 (1906); Ard v. Pratt, omp;,a note 106;
see also Note, L. R. A. 1918D 597.
11 Commonwealth v. Benn, 284 Pa. 421, 131 Atl. 253 (1925).
-4 But see New York Cent. R. R. v. N. Y. & Pa. Co., 271 U. S. 124,
46 Sup. Ct. 447 (1926), rev'g 281 Pa. 257, 120 Atl. 3S2 (1924), in which
it is held that failure to pursue statutory remcdics in state courts could
not deprive parties of their right to raise federal constitutional qucTtions
in a later proceeding.
n5 Fine v. Soifer, supra note 78, and cases there cited.
16 Southern Ind. Ry. v. R. R. Comm., 172 Ind. 113, S7 N. E. 960 (1909);
New York & Pa. Co. v. N. Y. Cent. R. R., supra note 114.
-7 New York & Pa. Co. v. N. Y. Cent. R. R., 27 Pa. 64, 110 At. 286
(1920); N. Y. & Pa. Co. v. New York Cent. R. M., mipra note 114.
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Before ending this article, it may not be amiss to consider the
practical methods of establishing res judicata; a matter which
presents few serious difficulties.
The existence of a prior judgment, which has adjudicated part
or all of a pending controversy, is primarily in the nature of a
fact; and this fact must be established as other facts. It cannot
be brought before the court by demurrer, unless the pleading
demurred to discloses on its face the existence of the judgment
or matter depended upon as res judicata; 118 but it can be raised
by any pleading whose office it is to put facts at issue, and ques-
tions thus raised will be dealt with and determined in the same
manner as other issues in the case. Just when the issue of res
judicata is to be brought forth must, of course, depend somewhat
on the nature of the case, and the practice of the court in which
the particular litigation is pending; some jurisdictions require
res judicata to be specially pleaded, while others do not. It is
essential, however, that the former judgment or matter claimed
as res judicata be properly brought- on the record, whether the
issue is to be determined on the pleadings or otherwise; for it
cannot be known to the court as a fact until established judi-
cially. In doing this, it is necessary that the record, as made,
shall show the issues in the former and the pending actions to
be the same and that the requisites of res judicata are present;
or, if the cause of action is not precisely the same, then the par-
ticular facts at issue in the pending action and those claimed to
have been adjudicated in the prior one must be shown to be the
same. If the record in the prior proceeding fails to disclose the
required information, some cases 119 hold that extrinsic evidence
may be introduced for the purpose of showing the facts and
issues there determined. Not only the existence of the prior
judgment must be proved but the record connected therewith has
to be brought in, because mere reference to the judgment itself
will establish only such matters as are absolutely essential to
'its existence.120 In some jurisdictions, the fact that the former
proceeding was in the same court, and perhaps before the same
judge, will not excuse formal proofs, for, even under these cir-
cumstances, judicial notice will not be taken of issues adjudicated
by a prior judgment.' 2, The proper course, then, where the
judgment or matter depended upon is not admitted or established
128 Steel v. Levy, 282 Pa. 338, 127 At]. 766 (1925).
1" Russell v. Place, 94 U. S. 606 (1876); Hartman v. Pittsburgh Incl.
Plane Co., 23 Pa. Super. 360 (1903); 34 C. J. 1072.
120 John Deere Plow Co. v. Hershey, supra note 55; 21 R. C. L. 477.
121Steel v. Levy, supra note 118; Sauber v. Nouskajian, 286 Pa. 449,
133 Atl. 642 (1926); John Deere Plow Co. v. Hershey, supra note 55;
Donner v. Board of Comn'rs, 278 I1. 189, 115 N. E. 831 (1917); Matthews
v. Matthews, 112 Md. 582, 77 Atl. 249 (1910); 23 C. J. 113.
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by the pleadings alone, is to make sure that all facts essential to
res judicata are set up as early in the action as possible, and
proved by competent evidence.
As already stated, some courts do not require a former judg-
ment to be specially pleaded as res judicata, but permit it to be
produced in evidence under a plea of the general issue.122 While
there is no unanimity of opinion as to this, yet those jurisdic-
tions which refuse to give conclusive force to a prior judgment
not specially pleaded, thereby permit mere want of pleading to
prolong litigation and cause the waste of public time,-the very
things which the doctrine under consideration is designed to pre-
vent. To illustrate how far most courts will go to end litiga-
tion and save time: ordinarily, appellate tribunals refuse to
consider, for purposes of bringing about reversals, points not
presented to the court below,1"- even when such a course may
terminate litigation; but exceptions to tlis rule are often made
where public policy is involved,'2 and a number of appellate
courts have very properly so treated questions of res judicata, ' 2
thus enabling such tribunals, when the record contains the req-
uisite data, to determine the case on a point not previously
pressed.
-2 Southern Pac. R. R. v. United States, 108 U. S. 1, 18 Sup. Ct. 13
(1897), and cases there cited; Marsh v. Pier, sz'pra note 3; Bruner v.
Finley, 211 Pa. 74, 60 Atl. 488 (1905); State Hospital v. Consolidatcd
Water Co., supra note 3; 1 GRxENLEAP, op. cit. supra note 13, 521. Cwz-
tra: Williams v. Williams, 265 Ill. 64, 106 N. E. 470 (1914); Krkelr v.
Ritter, 62 N. Y. 372 (1875); Smith v. Elliott, 9 Pa. 345 (1843); cf. Staf-
ford v. Clark, 2 Bing. 377 (1824). It is held in one case that where the
second proceeding is in the same court that entered the prior judgmcnt,
the court was bound to take judicial notice of it, even though it waz not
set up by the parties. Aetna Ins. Co. v. Dancer, 215 S. W. 962 (Tex. 1919).
Dewey v. Des Moines, 173 U. S. 193, 19 Sup. Ct. 379 (1899) ; Beaver
Borough v. Beaver Val. R. R., 217 Pa. 290, 66 Atl. 520 (1907); People
v. Cahill, 188 N. Y. 489, 81 N. E. 453 (1907); M Cloud v. Ill. Surety Co.,
83 N. J. L. 572, 83 Atl. 908 (1912); Dunbar v. Springer, 250 IM. 53, 99
N. E. 889 (1912); Frey v. Iver Johnson Co., 212 Mass. 213, 93 N. E.
682 (1912).
124 McMichael v. Horay, supra note 50; Allen v. City of Paterson, 99
N. J. L. 489, 123 Atl. 884 (1924); Massachusetts Nat. Bank v. Shinn,
163 N. Y. 360, 57 N. E. 611 (1900); Ellis v. Frawley, 165 Wis. 321, 161
N. W. 364 (1917); Oscanyan v. Arms Co., supra note 72; Memphis Keeley
Institute v. Keeley Co., 155 Fed. 964 (C. C. A. 0th, 1907).
-5 McMichael v. Horay, supra note 50; Rohm v. Jallans, 134 La. 913, G4
So. 829 (1914); State Hospital v. Consolidated Water Co., -upra note 3.
Contra: People v. Louisville & N. R. R., 298 Ill. 34, 131 N. E. 112 (1921) ;
Huggins v. Milwaukee Brew. Co., 10 Wash. 579, 39 Pac. 152 (1395);
Lindsley v. Sparks, 20 Tex. Civ. App. 56, 48 S. W. 201 (1893); Icett v.
Mlaclay, 265 Pa. 165, 10S Atl. 610 (1919); Ilousel . New Orleans Ry.
& Light Co., 152 La. 517, 93 So. 758 (1922); City of Harrisonville v. Fes-
ter, 264 Mo. 82, 174 S. W. 413 (1915); Long v. Louisville & N. R. R., 21
Ky. L. Rep. 1151, 54 S. W. 178 (1899).
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It may be noted, however, that, even in those jurisdictions
which view res judicata strictly as a matter of public policy, and
administer the doctrine accordingly, situations may arise where
the general welfare is best served by a re-litigation of issues
formerly decided. In such a case, if the parties entitled choose
not to plead res judicata, and a court sees fit to rehear the issues,
its action in so doing may be approved on appeal; but this does
not necessarily mean that the trial court would have been re-
versed on appeal had it followed the usual rule and refused to
re-try issues previously determined.
